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Copyright Protection for Video Games,
Computer Programs and Other
Cybernetic Works
By MARILYN A. BRODY*
I
Introduction
The Congress shall have Power... To Promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.'
When codifying the Constitutional basis for the protection of
intellectual property, Thomas Jefferson2 probably envisioned a
person like Nolan Bushnell. In 1972, this young electronic engi-
neer coupled a knowledge of human nature with the latest in-
tegrated circuit, the microcomputer chip,3 to produce "Pong,"
the first popular home video game.4 In 1981, sales of game-pro-
gram software5 alone exceeded two billion dollars,6 while ubiq-
uitous video arcades collected an additional twenty billion
* Member, Third Year Class. B.A., San Francisco State University, 1981. A ver-
sion of this note has been entered into the Nathan Burkan Memorial competition.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1790).
3. A microcomputer is a microelectronic integrated circuit combining all the
processing functions of a digital computer on a single "chip" or section of semiconduc-
tor wafer, usually silicon. See also C. SUPPL & R. SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY 320 (3d
ed. 1982).
4. For an interesting description of the development of video games and the
microprocessor technology, see D. HANSON, THE NEW ALCHEMISTS 203 (1982).
5. Computer software, in contrast to the "hardware" or physical components of a
computer system, encompasses all programs used within the system; so called be-
cause, unlike the hardware, they may readily be altered to enable the system to per-
form different functions. "Firmware" is a more colloquial term for software which has
been more permanently fixed in non-alterable computer memories: ROM (Read-Only
Memory) which is created with its embedded program, PROM (Programmable ROM)
which is capable of being programmed (once) after creation, and EPROM (Erasable
PROM) which may be repeatedly reprogrammed. RAM (Random Access Memory)
stores software in "volatile" form only for a given usage or "loading" of software from
Secondary or Mass Memory such as magnetic tape or disk or (flexible) "floppy disk."
6. Electronic Games Sweep the Entertainment Market, ELECTRONIC MARKET
TRENDS, June 1982, at 1 (monthly statistics of the Electronic Industries Association).
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quarters.' Lacking any clear form of legal protection, Pong was
the target of piracy within months of its introduction. Today,
the pirate's favorite target has shifted to the more lucrative and
vulnerable field of personal computer software.8 With
microcomputers finding application in automobiles, appli-
ances, telephones, television, office, factory, hospital and home,
and with the national annual expenditure for independently
developed software alone projected to surpass $25 billion by
the end of the decade,' the problem of protection is unlikely to
disappear of its own accord.
In January of 1983, Time magazine named the computer its
"Man of the Year."'10 Also in January, the Apple Corporation,
vanguard of the personal computer industry, introduced "a
computer for the average citizen," culminating a fifty million
dollar investment in humanized computer software." Yet only
six months previously, the economic foundation of that invest-
ment was threatened by an intelligent, well-reasoned, but es-
sentially inequitable ruling in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp. ,12 virtually denying copyright protection for
Apple's internal operating software.'3 This inequity stems
from confusion about software's classification within the scope
of intellectual property; this confusion excludes it from the
protection afforded "expressions," misidentifies it as an unpro-
tectible "idea," and relegates it to a gap between the subject
matter of copyright and of patent.
This note explains the origins of this confusion by examining
the complex and elusive nature of software, by tracing the his-
7. Id. at 3. In terms of total revenues from systems sold and quarters spent, video
arcade games represent a $6 billion-a-year business, more than the feature film and
phonograph record industries combined. It has been predicted that microcomputer
systems will have an 82% growth rate in 1983, with expected sales of $3.1 billion dollars.
See COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, Feb. 1983, at
8. E.g. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.
Pa. 1982).
9. Missing Computer Software, Bus. WK., Sept. 1, 1980, at 54.
10. Machine of the Year, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 12.
11. Apple takes on its biggest test yet, Bus. WK., Jan. 31, 1983, at 71.
12. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
13. The operating software (or operating system) of a computer system is an inte-
grated set of programs which manages it, controlling the flow of information to and
from user(s), programs and devices, and allocating available resources such as proces-
sor time, memory, disk storage space, etc. Contrast this with applications software
which performs directly "useful" functions such as data input, report printing, compu-
tation, graphic displays, etc. See also C. SIPPL & R. Sippi, supra note 3, at 424.
[Vol. 5
CYBERNETIC COPYRIGHT
torical divergence of the subject matter of patent and of copy-
right, and by identifying the gap which has developed between
these two mutually exclusive forms of protection for intellec-
tual property. It analyzes five legal issues forming the basis of
the confusion and contention surrounding protection for
software and other "cybernetic" works.'4 It then sets forth a
policy framework for resolution of these issues, suggests a cy-
bernetic copyright as a possible implementation of this policy,
and offers a workable mechanism to assist the courts in testing
for infringement.
II
The Software Protection Dilemma: The Gap
Between Patent and Copyright
A. The Roots of Confusion
As the primary vehicles for the protection of "intellectual
property,' 15 the Patent and Copyright Acts would seem the log-
ical source of any possible protection for computer software. 6
Unfortunately, fundamental philosophical differences between
the Patent and Copyright Offices, compounded by the nearly
metaphysical complexity of software concepts, have confused
both the courts and Congress.
The greatest single source of confusion seems to be the sim-
ple question, "What is software?" Terms like "algorithm,"' 7
"process," 8 "idea,"'" "law of nature"2 and "mathematical ex-
14. Cybernetic works are bodies of information capable of predictably controlling
or directing an electrical, mechanical or biological system towards a specific goal; com-
puter programs constitute the most common class of cybernetic works, but the tem-
plates which guide automatic knitting machines, the policy manual for an insurance
company and the DNA which directs the birth, growth and death of a human being are
all cybernetic systems. See also infra note 199.
15. "[Pjroducts of people's minds-ideas-that are translated into writings, com-
munications, documents, and tangible things." E. KINTNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 1 (2d ed. 1982).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. See generally Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). An algorithm is an or-
dered set of steps for carrying out a specific procedure to achieve a desired result. It is
more complex than a formula, because it may involve testing of parameters, selection
among paths, and repetition of operations. It is normally less complex than a program,
of which it is typically a component part.
18. Id. The term "process" means process, art or method, and includes a new use
of known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material. 35 U.S.C.
§ 100(b) (1976).
19. Id. See also Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
No. 31
COMM/ENT L. J.
pression"' 1 have been used to define software since the first
cases involving computer programs. It is universally acknowl-
edged that computer programs can be novel, non-obvious, use-
ful, creative and perhaps the very embodiment of genius.22 Yet
the Apple court failed to acknowledge the computer programs
as "works of authorship,"2 thus excluding them from the sub-
ject matter of copyright, while other courts have failed to ac-
knowledge them as "processes" or "devices," thus excluding
them from the subject matter of patent.24 If the computer is
indeed a "universal machine," the clay from which most tech-
nological advances will henceforth be shaped, then it is the
software which does the shaping. Ironically, it is this universal
but nebulous aspect that places some forms of computer
software in every specifically protected domain, but prohibits
its inclusion in any single one.25 Even a carefully reasoned
analysis may find software "neither fish nor fowl."26
The computer program, together with its cousin, the
database," is a pure embodiment of information.28 In attempt-
ing to comprehend it we often find ourselves, like Alice, on the
wrong side of the Looking Glass, talking to the White Knight:
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 821.
23. Id. at 823-824. See also Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Inl. 1979), affd on
other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
24. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
25. Confusion stems from the polymorphic nature of software. Each program un-
dergoes several steps of transformation from the programmer's original idea, to charts
and diagrams, encoding in a computer "language" as a "source program," mechanical
translation to machine-executable form or "object code," and finally to embodiment in
its ultimate medium of expression in "binary object form." See Iskrant, The Impact of
the Multiple Forms of Computer Programs on Their Adequate Protection by Copyright,
18 COPYRIGHT L. SyMp. (ASCAP) 92 (1968).
26. See generally Apple, 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982). This "pure information"
characteristic is evidenced in an increasing number of the latest technologies, includ-
ing direct broadcast satellite television, electronic funds transfer, and genetic engi-
neering. (See Cancer-Test Cells Taken from UCSD Lab to Japan, San Diego Union,
Jan. 27, 1983, at 1). Whether coded as genetic sequences, or bursts of highly com-
pressed data transmitted to satellites, information is the content.
27. "A typical data base is a vast and continuously updated file of information,
abstracts, or references on a particular subject or subjects." See also C. SIPPL & R.
SIPPL, supra note 3.
28. The computer deals with information in its "purest" form: numbers repre-
sented as sequences of "bits" or "binary digits," the simplest possible unit of informa-
tion. Although each bit can only represent two states (ON or OFF), appropriate bit
sequences can represent numbers, computer instructions (programs), data bases, text,
pictures or any form of information. See generally 1-3 D. KNUTH, THE ART OF COM-
PUTER PROGRAMMING (2d ed. 1975).
[Vol. 5
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"The name of the song is called 'Haddocks' Eyes'!"
"Oh, that's the name of the song, is it?" Alice said, trying to feel
interested.
"No, you don't understand," the Knight said, looking a little
vexed. "That's what the name is called. The name really is,
'The Aged Aged Man."'
"Then I ought to have said 'That's what the song is called',"
Alice corrected herself.
"No, you oughtn't: that's quite another thing! The song is
called 'Ways and Means': but that's only what it is called, you
know!"
"Well, what is the song then?" said Alice, who was by this time
completely bewildered.
"I was coming to that," the Knight said. "The song really is 'A-
Sitting on a Gate': and the tune's my own invention."
-Lewis Carroll
Through the Looking Glass
29
If trapped by incomplete or obsolete analogies, or armed with a
less than full understanding of the complex issues involved,
neither judge nor legislator can hope to strike the proper bal-
ance between insufficient and excessive protection for this vi-
tal industry.
B. Patent Protection
On inspection, the patent would seem the more appropriate
form of protection for the computer and its program together.
Section 101 of the Patent Act outlines the basic subject matter
of patent law: "any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof .... "0 The probable category for computer
29. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss 184-185 (St. Martin's Press 1977),
reprinted in W. McKEEMAN, J. HORNING & D. WORTMAN, A COMPILER GENERATOR 19
(1970).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 1-376 (1952) (emphasis added). This wording has survived largely
intact from section 1 of Jefferson's original Patent Act of 1790. 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1790). The
only significant changes occurred in 1952 when Congress overhauled the Act and con-
densed the redundant "engine, machine or device" simply to "machine," and updated
"art" to the more modern concept of "process." The very word "art," as in "useful
arts," had been and continues to be a source of ambiguity in both patent and copyright
interpretation. Within this framework, the word "art" is itself a "word of art" in the
legal sense. From the earliest usage, "art" was construed to mean "[a] system of prin-
ciples and methods employed in the performance of a set of activities [as I the art of
building [or a] trade or craft that applies such a system of principles and methods" as
opposed to "[a] nonscientific branch of learning" or "[t[he conscious production or
arrangement of sounds, colors, forms, movements ... that affects the sense of beauty
.... " See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 74 (New College ed. 1980).
No. 3]
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programs, the process, while not a physical invention itself, is
generally understood to include operations upon and transfor-
mations of physical matter. Indeed, the first patent issued
3 1
was for a "process," in a sense that has remained intact for
more than a century:
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to pro-
duce a given result. It is an art, or a series of acts, performed
upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a
different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patenta-
ble as a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law,
it is an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform
the process may or may not be new or patentable; whilst the
process itself may be altogether new and produce an entire
new result. The process requires that certain things should be
done with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the
tools to be used in doing this may be of secondary
consequence.32
This definition of a process under patent law is remarkably ap-
propriate to the functioning of a computer program: the pro-
gram is composed of a series of steps or "acts." These steps,
performed "in a certain order" transform the "subject-matter"
(information) to a "different state" more useful than the origi-
nal. The "machinery. . . to perform the process" (the general
purpose computer) need not be novel. The only difficulty in
applying this patent definition of process is that the computer
program transforms and produces not "matter" or "substance"
but information, traditionally the appropriate subject matter of
copyright.
Besides inclusion in the statutory subject matter, patentabil-
ity also requires sufficient innovation. The requirements of
utility,33 novelty,34 and non-obviousness 3 to one "skilled in the
31. The first patent was for apparatus and process for making potash and pearlash.
P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6.01, at 6-3 (2d ed. 1982).
32. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877), reprinted in P. ROSENBERG, id.
33. The patent requirement of utility demands only that the claimed invention be
useful or a useful improvement (upon prior art). 35 U.S.C. § 101. See also Gottschalk,
409 U.S. 63 (1972).
34. "Novelty" and "non-obviousness" are patent requirements specifying that a
patent may not be obtained "if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art




No. 3] CYBERNETIC COPYRIGHT
art"36 are outlined in sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act.
The wording of the 1952 revision of section 103 illustrates the
nature of the required "differences" by specifying what is not
patentable, rather than what is:
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between
the subject matters sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvi-
ous at the time the invention was made to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which
the invention was made.
37
Once granted, patent protection lasts seventeen years from
the date of issue,38 giving the holder "the right to exclude
others from making, using or selling the invention throughout
the United States. . .. ,,3" These broad rights are balanced by
the severely exclusive requirements and historically narrow
judicial interpretation of patent availability.' Only recently
has patent protection become available for computer pro-
grams, and then only in a very narrow factual setting, i.e., as an
integral part of a manufacturing process.4 Even though patent
seems suitable, its restrictive framework excludes most com-
puter software from patent protection.42
36. One "skilled in the art" is presumed to know the entire prior art; namely,
everything relating to the invention that was previously patented, or described in any
prior printed publication, or publicly used in the United States. See A. SEIDEL, WHAT
THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHoULD KNow ABoUT PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 19 (3d ed.
1975). (This hypothetically available body of knowledge is referred to as the "prior
art").
37. 35 U.S.C. § 103. The last sentence of Section 103 is generally acknowledged to
be a refutation of the "flash of genius" requirement previously found in many opinions
and exemplified by those of Judge Frank and Justice Douglas. See Cuno Engineering
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
39. Id.
40. A mathematical formula as such is not afforded protection under the patent
laws. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). "Excluded from . .. patent protection are
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 185 (1981).
41. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
42. While the patent is perhaps the most obvious category for protecting emi-
nently "useful" innovations, the difficulty, expense, and perhaps most significantly,
time involved in securing it, (considering the rate of technological obsolescence), is a
strong disadvantage. Further, the disinclination of the Patent Office to accept the ad-
ded burden (see infra note 92 and accompanying text) and the uncertainty in recent
higher court rulings (see Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) and Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584 (1978)), all argue against the ultimate utility of patent protection, at least
in the current climate. More dangerous still is the extreme breadth of coverage tradi-
tionally afforded patents, creating the potential for the abusive monopolization of ad-
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C. Copyright Protection
Copyright protection, in contrast to patent protection, has
continually expanded to incorporate new technological innova-
tions. From its original scope of "maps, charts and books,"43
subject matter coverage has been extended to include musi-
cal,44 dramatic, 45 choreographic, 46 pictorial,47 sculptural,48 cine-
matic,49 audiovisual5 ° and phonographic works.5 1  In 1974,
recognizing possible problems surrounding the applicability of
copyright to computer programs, Congress established the
Commission On New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU) to study the problem and make recommenda-
tions.52 Because the majority of the Commission viewed com-
puter programs as a form of literary work, and perhaps in
response to two Commissioners' dissent, computer programs
per se have not been explicitly enumerated within the subject
matter of title 17 of the United States Code. 4
The areas which have caused the greatest uncertainty in de-
vances in technology for an unreasonably long period of time. For these reasons
patent protection is not a suitable answer to the software protection problem. See also
infra note 167.
43. 1 Stat. 124 (1790). See CONTU, infra note 52, at 15.
44. 4 Stat. 436 (1831). See CONTU, infra note 52, at 15.
45. 11 Stat. 139 (1856). See CONTU, infra note 52, at 15.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1909). See CONTU, infra note 52, at 15.
47. 2 Stat. 171 (1802). See CONTU, infra note 52, at 15.
48. 16 Stat. 212 (1870). See CONTU, infra note 52, at 15.
49. 37 Stat. 488 (1912). See CONTU, infra note 52, at 15.
50. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1909). See CONTU, infra note 52, at 15.
51. 85 Stat. 391 (1972). See CONT, infra note 52, at 15.
52. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS, July 31, 1978 [hereinafter cited as CONTU].
53. See CONTU, supra note 52, at 27. (Hersey & Karpatkin, Comm'rs, dissenting).
54. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 (1976).
Section 102. Subject Matter of Copyright:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomines and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
No. 31 CYBERNETIC COPYRIGHT
fining the scope of protection for computer programs have
been the specific exclusion of "ideas, processes and princi-
ples"55 and the uncertainty surrounding copyright availability
for works fixed 56 in an unanticipated medium of expression."
Because computer programs are not specifically enumerated
within the subject matter of copyright,58 some commentators
find the current Copyright Act 59 applicable to all forms of
software,6" while others would include only enumerated as-
pects-the human-readable source program (as a literary
work 61) or any textual or audiovisual output.62 Further, the
radical and technically complex transformation the program
undergoes from source to object code63 might raise doubts
about how much protected "expression" is retained in the "de-
rivative work."'  Despite extensive congressional study,65 two
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is de-
scribed, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Section 103. Subject matter of copyright: Compilations and derivative Works
(a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by Section 102 includes com-
pilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing pre-
existing material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part
of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.
(b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from
the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any
exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is
independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, own-
ership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting
material.
55. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (emphasis added).
56. A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is suffi-
ciently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
57. E.g., ROM or floppy disk. The confusion surrounding copyrightability of these
"devices" involves failure to distinguish between the expression and the medium in
which the expression is embodied. See supra note 5. See also infra note 153 and ac-
companying text.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
59. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 (1976).
60. See, e.g., N. BOORSTYN, COPYIUGHT LAw § 2:21 (1981).
61. See, e.g., 1 M. NIMER, NIMMER ON CoPYRiGrHT § 2.04[C] (1981). For definition of
source program see supra note 25.
62. See CONTU, supra note 52, at 27.
63. See supra note 25.
64. A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation ... or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
65. See generally CONTU, supra note 52.
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recent revisions of the Copyright Act66 and Supreme Court re-
quests for legislative clarification,67 the problem is no closer to
solution.68
D. The Historical Divergence of Patent and Copyright
To "Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"6 9 the
framers of the Constitution used the economic incentive inher-
ent in protected ownership of intellectual properties. 70 By the
wording and interpretation of the Copyright and Patent Acts,
however, limits have been placed upon the types of property
that may be so protected. A lower limit on specificity is found
in the "original works,"'" "more than trivial change,' 72 "non-ob-
vious,"73 and "new and useful improvement"74 requirements.
An upper limit on abstractness and the domain of protection is
found in the Acts' exclusion of "laws of nature,"7 " "scientific
truths,"76  "natural elements ' 77 and, most significantly,
"ideas."
78
The subject matter of intellectual property was initially di-
vided along physical and abstract lines by the separate Acts
creating the Offices of Patent and Copyright.79 Each office was
responsible for determining appropriateness of submissions,
not only within the upper and lower bounds, but within the lat-
eral limits demarking the proper scope of the property itself.8"
66. The Copyright Act of 1976 generalized the previous "all writings of an author"
to "original works of authorship" regardless of their means of representation. The
next change specifically included a definition of computer program, and provided for
"fair use," but failed to specifically enumerate them under subject matter. Act of De-
cember 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10. See 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 (1976).
67. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 73.
68. Two relevant bills were introduced in the 1982 Congress but were not enacted:
H.R. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See infra note 184 and accompanying text. H.R.
6420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
70. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
72. Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-103 (2d Cir.
1951).
73. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
74. 35 U.S.C. § 101.




79. 1 Stat. 124 (1790). See also 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1790).
80. The lateral limits of coverage would be whatever was deemed to be within
"Progress in Science and useful Arts."
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The two categories were contiguous and together covered the
entire depth and breadth of intended subject matter with no
intervening "gap."
Over time, however, the approaches of the Patent and Copy-
right Offices have diverged significantly through practice, legis-
lation and judicial interpretation.8 The subject matter of
copyright has been repeatedly expanded, both specifically "2
and generally.83 Patent Office criteria, on the other hand, have
become more rigorous and exclusive, as exemplified by section
103 of title 35 United States Code and its negative definition of
patentability."4 This rigor is reasonable given the greater pro-
tection afforded patent holders against infringement not only
on a specific expression of an idea, but on the application of the
underlying principle. 5 Unfortunately, this convenient catego-
rization of subject matter by "application," (expression v. util-
ity, form v. function), has inadvertently led the two offices in
divergent directions. Patent has emphasized protection of
processes embodying ideas while copyright has stressed pro-
tection of expressions of ideas. Between these two protected
domains there has developed an unprotected gap; with time it
has become a chasm into which all objects cursed with appar-
ent "idea/expression identity"" are cast.
Computer programs in their object-code form87 fall too easily
into this category. Most patent decisions by the Supreme
Court88 find programs too abstract, too close to an "idea" for
protection; several recent copyright decisions89 find them too
81. E.g., in 1964 the Registrar of Copyrights announced that computer programs
would be accepted for registration. In 1966 the Patent Office rejected the notion that
programs could be patented, primarily for reasons of impracticality under the rigorous
tests.
82. See supra notes 44-51.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1909) "all writings of an author," and 17 U.S.C. app. § 102 (1976)
"original works of authorship" were both attempts to define the subject matter
inclusively.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
85. 35 U.S.C. § 154.
86. "When the 'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the 'expres-
sion' will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would
confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and
limitations imposed by the patent law." Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Synercom, 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D.
Tex. 1978).
87. See supra note 25.
88. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67,. and infra note 167.
89. See Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 823-824 and infra note 116.
No. 3]
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physical, too "useful," too close to "processes" to be copy-
righted. That computer software, the foundation of so many
technological advances,90 should be disowned by both its po-
tential legal guardians is extremely frustrating for its au-
thors.9 That it should be specifically abandoned by its more
obvious parent, patent, is totally disheartening:
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for pro-
grams because of a lack of a classification technique and the
requisite search files. Even if these were available, reliable
searches would not be feasible or economic because of the tre-
mendous volume of prior art being generated. Without this
search, the patenting of programs would be tantamount to
mere registration and the presumption of validity would be all
but nonexistent.92
Since 1964, "mere registration" is precisely the basis for pro-
tection offered by the Copyright Office to computer programs.
It would be reassuring to infer from the several successful de-
fenses of video game copyrights that computer programs, per
se, were afforded protection. Unfortunately, a careful reading
of those cases reveals that protection was only afforded to the
underlying computer programs as implementations of the au-
diovisual aspects of the game.93 As of this writing, the ultimate
outcome of any particular choice of protection is uncertain;
clear guidelines are unavailable.
E. Patent and Copyright: Mutually Exclusive Forms of Protection
The lack of clear direction in this field of law is significant
because patent and copyright protection are normally mutu-
ally exclusive, Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations gov-
erning patents, trademarks and copyrights states:
A claim to copyright in a scientific or technical drawing, other-
wise registrable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, will
not be refused registration solely by reason of the fact that it is
known to form a part of a pending patent application. Where
the patent has been issued, however, the claim to copyright in
the drawing will be denied copyright registration 94
90. Missing Computer Software, Bus. WK., Sept. 1, 1980, at 46.
91. Id.
92. To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 13 (1966).
93. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982). See also Wil-
liams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
94. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (emphasis added).
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Conversely, in rejecting the claims for a patent of an appli-
cant who had previously registered the same design (of a la-
bel) under copyright, the Supreme Court in In re Blood
affirmed the denial by the Commissioner of Patents, noting:
The design is not entitled to double registration, once as a label
design, and again as a design for a hosiery ticket. Such a
course would result for all practical purposes in an extension
of the design monopoly. The applicant was entitled to apply
for a patent for the design as a hosiery label, or he might com-
plete the label, and register the design, so completed, as a la-
bel. He could not do both. He elected to pursue the latter
course, and has obtained the protection thereby assured to
him, and he is bound by that election.95
Mutual exclusion sweeps a broad class of computer pro-
grams into the unprotected gap between patent and copyright.
These programs are typically classified as "operating system"
' 96
or "utility"97 software embodying a "process,"9 8 as opposed to
"application programs,"99 which are more often seen as embod-
ying "expressions"'100 which are themselves explicitly copy-
rightable. 10 1 It is indeed ironic that an intent to advance
"science and useful arts" should ultimately promote question-
ably useful video games yet deny protection to the clearly valu-
able operating software of the Apple personal computer.
III
Apple v. Franklin-An Informed Injustice
A. The Arguments Against Copyright Protection for Software
It would be easy to dismiss many software protection denials
95. In re Blood, 23 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (citation omitted).
96. See supra note 13.
97. Utility programs are those parts of the operating system and its associated
complement of programs which perform indirectly useful or "utility" functions. Exam-
ples of these are text editors (to create source code), compilers (to translate the source
into object form), linkers (to resolve all references in the object program to system
functions upon which it depends), and loaders (to bring the object program into RAM
on demand, relocate it properly and run it). See also supra note 13.
98. See supra note 18.
99. "An application program has a specific task, ordinarily chosen by the user,
such as to maintain records, perform certain calculations, or display graphic images.
Application programs are normally written in high level languages which are designed
to be easily used by the unsophisticated." See Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 814. See also
supra note 13.




as stemming from the application of archaic thinking and inap-
propriate analogies to modern complexities. The reasoning in
Apple v. Franklin,1°2 however, is clear, well-researched and
well-stated, yet the court denies protection to Apple's most val-
uable asset-its proprietary operating system software. The
denial incorporates three of the five major arguments against
protection for such software discussed in this section. It thus
provides a framework for addressing the five legal issues
involved.
Largely because of its user-oriented operating software, six-
year-old Apple Computer, Inc., is currently the leading manu-
facturer of personal computers. Its major product, the Apple
II, is sold in a package including this software, and a large body
of independently developed software is available for the sys-
tem. Franklin Computer Corp. produced its Ace 100 using the
same microprocessor'0 3 and an unauthorized copy of Apple's
copyrighted operating software, ostensibly to take advantage
of the "wealth of Apple-compatible material that exists in the
market place."'1 4 Apple moved for a preliminary injunction re-
straining Franklin from infringing its registered copyrights on
the object codes stored in the Apple II's ROMs and floppy
disks. The injunction was denied because of the court's doubts
about the copyrightability of the object code form of operating
programs. Three arguments underlying these doubts may be
categorized as:
1) the "functionality" argument;
2) the "end result" argument; and
3) the "medium of expression" argument.
A less complex issue not addressed in Apple is:
4) the "notice" argument;
and a final issue only mentioned briefly is:
5) the "algorithm" argument.
1. The "Functionality" Argument
According to this argument, the function of a computer pro-
gram is not to express an idea but to control the workings of
102. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
103. "Microprocessor" and "microcomputer" are used interchangeably, (see C.
SIPPL & R. SIPPL, supra note 3), but in the strictest sense, the microprocessor need only
contain the control, arithmetic and logical processing elements of a computer (i.e., the
CPU or Central Processing Unit), while the true microcomputer must contain (at least
some) memory and I/O (Input/Output) elements as well.
104. See Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 815.
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the computer; it analogizes software to a machine part, a non-
copyrightable "useful article." This reasoning is central to the
Apple 1 opinion and to Commissioner Hersey's dissent to the
CONTU majority recommendations. 106 The argument follows
the "separability of utilitarian aspects" logic of Mazer v.
Stein, 07 the "system" reasoning of Baker v. Selden,' °8 and the
"integral part of the machine" thinking of Taylor v. Fawley-
Brost,10 9 and Brown Instrument v. Warner."0 In denying copy-
right validity for Apple's operating software, the court cites
Commissioner Hersey's comparison of a program to an auto-
motive cam governing the function of a machine rather than
embodying a form of expression."' While the opinion in Apple
hesitates to "conclude that Apple will be able to satisfy the
rather rigorous tests of the patent law,""' 2 it is paradoxical that
its "art" is not protected precisely because it is "useful" rather
than "expressive. '
This "functionality" issue was addressed in White-Smith v.
Apollo,"' where the Supreme Court declared a piano roll not a
"copy" of the musical composition recorded thereon because
the pattern on the roll was not "a written or printed record...
in intelligible notation.""' Citing this logic, the district court in
Data Cash v. JS&A "6 held the ROM of a computer chess pro-
105. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
106. Commissioner Hersey's main contention centers on the apparently crucial dis-
tinction between man and machine. See CONTU, supra note 52, at 27.
107. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The use of statuettes as bases for electric
lamps did not invalidate the copyright of the statuettes as works of art insofar as the
utilitarian and artistic aspects could be separated.
108. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). An author of a book describing a system of
bookkeeping was not allowed to claim exclusive ownership of the underlying system of
bookkeeping under the law of copyright. Thus the accounting form was held not copy-
rightable but the explanation of its use was.
109. Taylor Instrument Companies v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943).
A chart used in connection with a recording thermometer was found not to be included
under the proper subject of copyright because it neither taught nor explained the use
of the art but was an essential element of the machine.
110. Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947). Calibrated
graphic charts, intended for use as integral parts of a device for mechanically record-
ing temperature, pressure, etc. were ruled not copyrightable because they were not
intended for the purpose of giving information.
111. See Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 824.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Company, 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
115. Id. at 17.
116. Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
afd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
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gram was not a "copy." The 1976 Copyright Act expressly nulli-
fied this reasoning by affording protection to works which "can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device," but the under-
lying bias against mechanized expressions persists.
The Apple court" 7 also seems to require that the "expres-
sion" be inherently communicative to be copyrightable. Hold-
ing that the operating software does not constitute
'"expression" or "communication" because there is no one to
whom "expression" is "communicated," the court concludes:
If the concept of "language" means anything, it means an abil-
ity to create human interaction. It is the fixed expression of
this that the copyright law protects, and only this. To go be-
yond the bounds of this protection would be ultimately to pro-
vide copyright protection to the programs created by a
computer to run other computers. With that, we step into the
world of Gulliver where horses are "human" because they
speak a language that sounds remarkably like the one humans
use. It is an intriguing analogy but false." 8
Judge Learned Hand's eloquent argument against this "com-
munication function" requirement in Reiss v. National Quota-
tion Bureau, Inc. 9 is specifically mentioned in the Apple
decision, 2 ° but is quickly dismissed. It is relegated to "the
problems of description that makes this problem so baffling,"
when, in fact, those problems are the very issues requiring
clarification. Any definition of expression or communication
based essentially on meaning is specifically refuted in Reiss,
where the copyright was sought for intrinsically meaningless
code words, the meaning to be supplied by the user:
Mathematics has its symbols, indeed a language of its own, Pe-
anese, understood by only a few people in the world. Suppose
a mathematician were to devise a new set of compressed and
more abstract symbols and left them for some conventional
meaning to be filled in.
Not all words communicate ideas; some are mere spontaneous
117. See Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 824.
118. Id. at 825. The Apple court stated that "The logic of the court in Midway does
not resolve the problem raised in this case." Id. The Midway logic held that the "form,
manner or medium of fixation" are irrelevant to copyrightability, much in the spirit of
the 1976 overhaul of the Copyright Act. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic International, Inc., 547
F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
119. Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
120. See Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 822.
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ejaculations .... A pattern or an ornamental design depicts
nothing; it merely pleases the eye. If such models or paintings
are "writings," I can see no reason why words should not be
such because they communicate nothing. They may have their
uses for all that, aesthetic or practical, and they may be the
productions of high ingenuity, or even genius. Therefore, on
principle, there appears to me no reason to limit the Constitu-
tion in any such way as the defendants require.
21
In light of this opinion, the end "uses . . .aesthetic or practi-
cal," to which the "new set of. . .abstract symbols" are ulti-
mately put can in no way exclude them from the class of
"original works of authorship."'122 The Apple court's logic
would require copyrightable works to be judged not by the
presence of authorship but by the intent to "communicate" to
human readers.123 This reversal of cause and effect is closely
related to the fallacy underlying the second major argument.
2. The "End Result" Argument
This argument avoids determining copyrightability of the un-
derlying computer program by focusing on the output of the
program. It proposes that the originating work is copyrightable
only if the "end result" is a work which is itself statutorily
copyrightable. 124 This novel "reverse derivative" approach is
merely suggested in Commissioner Nimmer's "concurrence" to
the CONTU report of 1978:
I should like to suggest a possible line ... between protectible
and nonprotectible software in a manner more consistent with
... the conventional copyright arena ... not because I recom-
mend its immediate implementation, but rather because it may
prove useful in the years to come ... to limit copyright protec-
tion for software to those computer programs which produce
works which themselves qualify for copyright protection....
A program designed for a computer game would be copyright-
able because the output would itself constitute an audiovisual
work.... [Programs] which control traffic signals would not
be eligible for copyright because their operations do not result
in copyrightable works .... [Provision for] a printout of writ-
ten instructions (which would be copyrightable) would only
121. See Reiss, 276 F. at 718. Peanese is a mathematical language devised by Giu-
seppe Peano, who lived from 1858-1932. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 964 (New
College ed. 1980).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
123. See Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 824-825.
124. See CONTU, supra note 52, at 27.
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render protectible that particular aspect of such a program. 125
Subsequent to the enactment of the Computer Software Copy-
right Act of 1980,126 Professor Nimmer concluded that "[any
lingering doubts as to the copyrightabil[ity] of computer pro-
grams was dispelled" by the Act. "[A]lthough it remains tac-
itly assumed that computer programs fall within the definition
of 'literary works,' a revised section 117 makes it clear, albeit by
negative implication, that reproduction and adaptation of com-
puter programs constitute infringing acts" except as explicitly
exempted. 2 7 Although a definition of a "computer program"
was added to section 101 by the 1980 Act, 128 Nimmer noted the
significant omission of computer programs from the enumer-
ated subject matter of section 102. Rather than construing this
omission as excluding computer software from copyright pro-
tection, he concluded that specific enumeration was deemed
unnecessary by the drafters of the Act. This omission is in ac-
cord with the opinion of the House, Senate and CONTU major-
ity that computer programs were already included under
"literary works.' 29
Unfortunately, implicit inclusion has been insufficient to
guarantee protection of computer programs in the courts.
Even in the realm of video games, where the "end result" is a
specifically copyrightable audiovisual work, there is some disa-
greement. In Atari v. North American Philips,'13 it was Atari's
"Pac-Man" video game character which was found to be in-
fringed upon (tacitly following Walt Disney v. Air Pirates131),
rather than the underlying computer program. In Atari v.
Amusement World, 32 however, the court found another video
game to be non-infringing in that the limited possible forms of
expression might permit monopolization of an idea, paralleling
Rosenthal v. Kalpakian.133 Although Midway v. Artic 34 found
125. Id.
126. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10.
127. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 61, at 2-42, 2-43.
128. Act of Dec. 12, 1980.
129. See 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 61, at 2-42 n.21.
130. Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
617-618 (7th Cir. 1982).
131. Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972). See
infra notes 241 and 243 and accompanying text.
132. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc. 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
133. See Rosenthal, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). See also infra note 242 and accom-
panying text.
134. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic International, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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for the plaintiff's program, it distinguished between the fixed
and repetitive "attract" mode of the program as opposed to the
user-altered "play" mode. This reasoning was countered in
Stern v. Kaufman ,'13 by the finding of sufficient "fixation" de-
spite player involvement.
136
In defense against this uncertainty, the plaintiff in Williams
v. Artic137 registered copyrights on three aspects of its video
game: the source program was registered as a literary work,
and the play and attract modes as audiovisual works. This
proved useful in that the court found infringement of the "ar-
tistic expression in original works which have met the
statutory fixation requirement through their embodiment in
the ROM devices."' 38 Three days earlier, in Apple v. Frank-
lin,'3 the "end product" reasoning suggested by Professor
Nimmer in CONTU'1 ° was employed against the plaintiff. The
court denied Apple's motion for a preliminary injunction
against Franklin, partly because the "end result" of the operat-
ing software was not "expression" but control of the com-
puter's own internal workings. In his CONTU "concurrence,"
Professor Nimmer had proposed this interpretation only as a
"safety net" should the protection of computer programs as ab-
stractions become so encompassing as to inhibit the free ex-
change of their underlying "ideas.'1' The Apple court clearly
misconstrued Professor Nimmer's intent.
3. The "Medium of Expression" Argument
This argument postulates that because the machine-reada-
ble l's and O's (the final form of a computer program) are not
"perceived" by a human in any ordinary sense, the embodi-
ment of the object code does not constitute a "tangible medium
of expression."'" The Apple 143 opinion cites and concurs with
135. See Stern, 669 F.2d at 855-856.
136. This issue of the computer program and its user cooperatively acting as "joint
authors" of a new derivative work will itself grow in importance with the rise of
"knowledge-based" "expert systems" for the field of artificial intelligence. See
Treleaven & Lima, Japan's Fifth-Generation Computer Systems, COMPUTER, Aug. 1982,
at 79. See also Note, Can a Computer be an Author? Copyright Aspects of Artificial
Intelligence, 4 CoMM/ENT L.J. 707 (1982).
137. Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
138. Id. at 874.
139. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
140. See CONTU, supra note 52, at 27.
141. Id.
142. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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the lower court's decision in Data Cash v. JS&A " where ob-
ject code (computer-readable only) was held not to be the sub-
ject matter of copyright. Opposing this view was Tandy Corp.
v. Personal Micro Computers,45 explicitly rejecting the Data
Cash146 reasoning and affording protection to the operating
system ROM.
147
Apple v. Franklin 148 tacitly rejects Tandy's protection for the
functionally identical operating system programs in ROM, stat-
ing "this analysis contradicts somewhat the view of the
CONTU majority that a 'tapped off' ROM may not be protected
from copyright infringement." '49 This confusion of "tapping
off" with Franklin's copying from Apple's Read-Only-Memory
(ROM) is a subtle but critical misunderstanding of the CONTU
report, which states:
When a program is copied into the memory of a computer, it
still exists in a form from which a human-readable version may
be produced. That is, the copy in the computer's memory may
be duplicated, just as a version listed on paper or coded on
magnetic tape [or disk] may be. Only when the program is in-
serted--instruction by instruction-into the processing ele-
ment of the computer and electrical impulses are sent through
the circuitry of the processor to initiate work is the ability to
copy lost. This is true at least under the present state of tech-
nology. If it should prove possible to tap off these impulses
then, perhaps, the process would be all that was appropriated,
and no infringement of the copyright would occur.
5
0
It is clear that "tap" is used here in the sense of "wiretap."
Consider a copyrighted computer program (stored in memory)
used to control the lighting, heating and cooling units of a
building by sending signals to them at certain "pre-program-
med" times. "Reading out"'' that program from memory
143. See Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 818.
144. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
145. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal.
1981).
146. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
147. See Tandy, 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981). In Data Cash the issue of
copyrightability of object code in ROM was not specifically addressed by the higher
court but the lower court's decision was affirmed on other grounds. Specifically, the
lack of notice placed the work in the public domain under the applicable 1909 Act.
Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
148. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
149. Id. at 823.
150. See CONTU, supra note 52, at 22 (emphasis added).
151. "To sense information contained in the internal storage of a computer and
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would (in CONTU's view) be an infringement, but observing or
recording the sequence of signals generated by the computer
executing that program (for the purpose of replicating the
"process") would not. Failure to distinguish between the pro-
tectible "expression" and the physical "medium" in which it is
fixed appears to be the primary source of confusion.
The Apple interpretation of the ROM as a physical device
rather than a medium embodying an expression,1 52 invokes an
aspect of White-Smith v. Apollo,'153 namely that a "device" can-
not constitute a "medium of expression." The distinction be-
tween the unprotectible medium and the protectible
expression it embodies is elusive and can easily be miscon-
strued. Without this distinction, even a position relying on the
logic of Judge Learned Hand in Reiss 154 to escape the "mean-
ing" interpretation and the 1976 Copyright Act's negation of the
"eye-readability" requirement, 15 5 cannot categorically guaran-
tee software protectibility.
4. The "Notice" Argument
This argument involves the potential difficulty of providing
"eye-readable" copyright notice on works which need never be
legible or even visible to be copied. The requirements for
proper notice have been greatly relaxed in the Copyright Act of
1976,156 but the inappropriateness of a "visually perceived" no-
tice to primarily machine-readable works remains problemati-
cal. Data Cash v. JS&A 157 misconstrues the "obviousness" of
the necessary copyright notice in predominantly machine-
readable media. The court states: "It does not seem to be de-
nied that a copyright notice could have been placed in the
ROM[ 151 so that one who read out the game could not miss see-
transmit this information to an external storage unit." See C. SIPPL & R. SIpPi, supra
note 3.
152. See Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 823-824.
153. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
155. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 (1976).
156. 17 U.S.C. § 401. The failure to affix copyright notice to publicly distributed
works does not result in the automatic forfeiture of copyright, as had been the case
under the 1909 Act.
157. Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1068 (N.D. 111. 1979),
affd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
158. ROM = Read Only Memory (a computer memory which can only be read, not
written into). See C. SIPPL & R. SiPPL, supra note 3.
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ing it, and we understand this is now done."1 59
The first fallacy is the assumption that "copying" always in-
volves human perception; the second is that any "printout"
would always reveal an embedded copyright notice. If
machine-readable "bits" (l's and O's), or even human-readable
mnemonic machine instructions (assembly codes), 6 ° were ex-
tracted from a ROM or other binary medium,161 no alphanu-
meric text 162 need ever be seen at all.
An example of the problem is Williams v. Artic, 63 where a
video game's creators strengthened their claim by "burying"
just such a copyright notice among the binary object-code in-
structions in the ROM, and it was not recognized by the in-
fringers until it was revealed by plaintiff's examination of the
blatantly pirated copies. That these otherwise unnecessary
sets of l's and O's were mistaken for a functional part of the
game and not defensively deleted demonstrates the difficulty,
even among specialists, of discriminating "instructions" from
"data.' 64 The argument was not that the "buried" text consti-
tuted the required notice, 65 but rather that it was prima facie
evidence of "slavish" copying.
As access to information progresses from the printed to the
electronic mode, "copying" will less frequently involve physi-
cal reproduction, proximity or human perception, and even
"printouts" may not generally reveal copyright notice. The in-
tent of the 1976 Copyright Act, 6 6 that accidental omission of
notice should not negate copyright protection, may reasonably
be extended to cover works where visible notice is technologi-
cally impractical. An extension to the Copyright Act might
only require that notice be "perceived by aid of" the same
"machine or device" used to copy the work itself. This argu-
159. See Data Cash, 628 F.2d at 1041 (emphasis added).
160. A computer program that operates on symbolic input data to produce from
such data machine instructions by carrying out: translation of symbolic-operation
codes into computer operation instructions .... See C. SIPPL & R. SiPPI, supra note 3.
161. E.g., Random Access Memory (RAM), magnetic tape or disk.
162. Consisting of alphabetic and numerical symbols. See AMERICAN HERITAGE Dic-
TIONARY 37 (New College ed. 1980).
163. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 872.
164. "[Data] connotes basic elements of information which can be processed or pro-
duced by a computer." "[Instructions areI a set of identifying characters designed to
cause a computer to perform certain operations." See C. SIPPL & R. SIPP, supra note 3,
at 126, 249.
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 401.
166. Id.
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ment against copyright protection for software is basically
unconvincing.
5. The "Algorithm" Argument
The rejection of computer programs because they are
"merely an algorithm" and hence unprotectible as a "scientific
truth" or a "law of nature" has been advanced more often in
patent denials than copyright. 167 Nonetheless, both Acts, Of-
fices and the relevant court decisions uniformly reject any-
thing hinting at the monopolization of an idea. Unfortunately
the notion of an algorithm is not accurately amenable to anal-
ogy: an analogy must always oversimplify and when an al-
gorithm is oversimplified, it is indeed reduced to an idea or
fundamental truth.
68
The Midway v. Artic 69 and Atari v. Amusement World
70
copyright cases both noted the non-copyrightability of a basic
idea. The former upheld the uniqueness of expression by a
subjectively quantitative analysis.' 71 The latter found the ex-
pression and idea so close as to be indistinguishable. 72 This
distinction parallels the "two-step doctrine" now used by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals: first, the application is
examined for subject matter propriety; second, its novelty,
167. In Gottschalk v. Benson, the court explicitly rejected the work at issue as an
"algorithm" attempting to monopolize any application of a "law of nature." Gottschalk
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). Eight years later, in Arshal v. United States, identical
reasoning was employed, this time explicitly indicating the application for a "mathe-
matical expression." Arshal v. United States, 621 F.2d 421, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 101 S.
Ct. 857, reh'g denied, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1771 (Ct. Cl. 1980). In Parker v. Flook, inclu-
sion of an operation after the computer solution (of the mathematical formula for cur-
ing rubber) was insufficient to make a common process eligible for patent protection.
Parker v. Flook 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Strangely, shortly after Flook, an almost identical
process was held patentable in Diamond v. Diehr, despite the lesser degree of com-
plexity than in Flook. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). The major difference
between the successful Diehr and the unsuccessful Flook was in the drafting of the
patent application so that the process did not appear to be a "mere algorithm" but an
integral part of the manufacturing process. For definition of algorithm, see supra note
17.
168. For a comprehensive definition of what an algorithm is and is not, see 1 D.
KNUTH, THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING, FUNDAMENTAL ALGORITHMS (2d ed.
1975). See also Novick & Wallenstein, The Algorithm and Computer Software Patenta-
bility: A Scientific View of a Legal Problem, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 313
(1980).
169. 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Il. 1981).
170. 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
171. 547 F. Supp. at 1001.
172. 547 F. Supp. at 228.
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originality and uniqueness is ascertained. 7 ' Although no de-
mands for artistic merit are placed upon works applying for
copyright, sufficient originality is required to avoid monopoliz-
ing works in the public domain or the copyright equivalent of
"prior art. ' 174
The "algorithm = law of nature" reasoning is further flawed
in its assumption that computer programs are somehow "dis-
covered" and not "invented" or "authored." All creations of
man are "compilations" of the basics of nature. The most
amazing "compositions of matter" are synthesized from
ninety-two "natural elements." A "machine" as complex as the
space shuttle is built up from millions of basic components.
All the "works" of Shakespeare are created out of twenty-six
letters and a handful of punctuation. Every miracle of Bach or
Mozart is produced from a mundane scale of notes and tones.
The genius, or at least the intellectual "progress," resides in
the novelty and complexity of the composition, arrangement
and particular expression or implementation of the unpro-
tectible "idea" using "natural" phenomena. An algorithm is
not natural but artificial and highly specific to the problem ad-
dressed, its environment and its author's goals. Many diverse
algorithms will "solve" a given problem, just as numerous
routes may reach a given destination. Algorithms differ in
speed, length, simplicity, predictability and appropriateness to
the setting, even when they embody the same constituent idea.
They differ widely in their precise expression; it is this expres-
sion alone that should be copyrightable.
B. The Current Status of Software Copyright Protection
Opinions on the availability of copyright protection for com-
puter software are presently divided. The Copyright Office
continues to register programs, and one faction persuasively
argues that the Copyright Act, as amended in 1980, clearly in-
cludes all forms of all computer programs. 75 Another group
asserts that although the "negative implications"'7 6 of title 17
United States Code section 117177 suggest some computer pro-
173. The first step tests for inclusion of the invention within subject matter (§ 101),
and the second is the test of "non-obviousness" (§§ 102 and 103). See supra note 30.
174. See Alfred Bell, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
175. This group argues that the problem is primarily one of "educating" the courts.
See Boorstyn, Copyrights, Computers, and Confusion, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 276 (1981).
176. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 61, at 2-43.
177. Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (1981).
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grams may be copyrightable, it does not necessarily follow that
all computer programs fall within the subject matter of section
102.178 The turmoil surrounding the copyrightability of the ob-
ject code version of an operating system, as evidenced in Ap-
ple,179 graphically illustrates the difficulties of interpreting the
present Act. This statutory ambiguity leading to the possible
exclusion of the program from the subject matter of copyright,
combined with the probable "algorithmic" exclusion from pat-
ent, sweeps the program through the "gap" into the public
domain.
The courts at many levels have repeatedly asked for legisla-
tive clarification, 8 ° but it has been slow in coming. In 1982,
however, two bills'8 ' were introduced to remedy this situation.
Both squarely addressed the problem of copying. One bill in-
cluded both computer programs and databases within the sub-
ject matter of copyright "to strengthen the laws against
computer program and data base piracy and counterfeiting."' 82
The second, introduced by Representative Kastenmeier, de-
fines three categories of cybernetic works'83 to be specifically
protected:
1) the "computer program," defined as the set of instructions
in either source or object form;
2) the "supporting material" including manuals and docu-
mentation internal and external to the source program; and
3) a category called "program description," defined as "a com-
plete procedural representation in verbal, schematic, or other
form, in sufficient detail to determine a set of instructions con-
stituting a corresponding computer program.184
This last category may be dangerously broad, 8 ' but the sen-
timent is well-considered and clearly appropriate. It is axio-
matic that this is the very form of "Progress of Science and the
useful Arts" that the Constitution seeks to promote. 86
Representative Kastenmeier's approach incorrectly assumes
that the process of transformation from the descriptive mate-
178. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
179. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
180. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 73.
181. See supra note 68.
182. H.R. 6420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
183. See supra note 14.
184. H.R. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (emphasis added).
185. E.g. monopolizing the idea expressed in the "program description."
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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rial to a working object program187 is a trivial, straightforward
or mechanical step. 188 At present, fully 55% of the total devel-
opment effort' 89 is expended after the coding into computer
language has been performed, involving laborious and intricate
"debugging" of the program to reach a "correct" working
state.190 Where programs are encoded in non-alterable ROMS
(e.g., as in Apple) or chips selling for a few dollars yet costing
hundreds to "repair" once installed in a high volume product,
the value of an absolutely "bug-free" object program is
immense. 91
Significantly, it is the particular "expression" which is the
item of value, far more than the idea it expresses, and it is this
alone that needs protection. Such protection is the normal
province of copyright, but as expression merges with function-
ality, the traditional separation of an idea and its expression is
lost. Numerous valued advances in science and technology
thus fall into the "chasm."' 92
C. A Suggested Policy Framework
Any proposal for explicit legal protection of software must
strike a delicate balance among several considerations: the
monopoly on the use of the property must balance the needs of
the public for fair use;193 the ease of registration and examina-
tion must be weighed against the ease of defense of validity or
infringement; and the need for consistency must be balanced
by the necessary flexibility to adapt to changing situations and
new technologies. All of these factors must converge to yield a
minimum burden on the entities involved: the governmental
agencies in registration, the courts in litigation, the drafters in
preparation, the innovators in dissemination of their efforts
and the public in the unrestricted "fair use" of the innovation.
Reformulated succinctly, there are four potential pitfalls to
187. A "working object program" is one which is sufficiently free from the ubiqui-
tous program "bugs" which often persist for years after the program's first installation.
188. The closer a program comes to bug-free "perfection," the more subtle and elu-
sive are the sources of the problems which remain. Since, by their very persistence
they are seldom seen, their isolation and correction is as difficult a piece of detective
art as any fictional sleuth's; the task is far from trivial.
189. See Fawcette, ADA Tackles Software Bottleneck, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 1983,
at 50.
190. See supra note 188.
191. See supra notes 90 and 189.
192. E.g., Apple's operating system.
193. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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be avoided in offering explicit copyright protection to computer
software:
(1) protection must not extend beyond the prohibition of
"slavish" or mechanically-assisted copying of the particu-
lar expression to the underlying idea or technique;
(2) the monopoly, even upon the expression, should not ex-
tend beyond a time sufficient for the innovator to reap
just economic benefits from his or her effort and into the
time when such an advance should be publicly available
"prior art"; such provision within copyright protection
would be analogous to the 1842 inclusion in the Patent Act
of design patents on artistic but useful articles: 194 not
only was the rigor of the normal patent process reduced
to near copyright-level registration but the time limit of
possible protection was radically reduced to an applicant-
elected choice among 3.5, 7 and 14 years;
9 5
(3) the implementation of such protection should not unduly
overburden the responsible federal agencies or enlarge
the existing bureaucracy by establishing a new and in-
dependent agency; it must specifically exclude any rigor-
ous registration examination because of the complexity
and rate of advance of the subject matter and the virtually
intractable scope of the prior art; and
(4) it must provide such pre-litigation clarity and standards
as will not impose an avalanche of suits and countersuits
upon an already overburdened federal court system; fur-
ther, it should provide for rapid, accurate, verifiable and
scientifically and judicially acceptable means for deter-
mining the validity of copyrights, where challenged, and
the presence and degree of alleged infringement, where
possible by use of modern computer technology.
In response to these requirements a cybernetic copyright is
suggested as an extension of the existing Copyright Act. Such
an extension would provide definitive protection to all legiti-
mate original works of authorship whose copyrightability
might be questioned because of their informational/utilitarian
nature.196 A cybernetic copyright would guarantee protection
194. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
195. 35 U.S.C. § 173.
196. The subsequent definitions form the theoretical foundations of the proposed
cybernetic copyright. The legal foundations are found in the basic definition of the
subject matter of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 102. The conceptual foundations are derived
from the fundamental requirements of patent law, (see supra notes 30, 33, 34, and 36,
and the special provisions of the design patent, 35 U.S.C. § 171). The historical founda-
tions are embodied in article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution and in the speci-
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for the particular expression embodied in computer programs,
data bases, microcircuit layouts,'197 "micromachines"198 and
any yet-to-be-created works where the intellectual property is
"informational," regardless of its application. It would bridge
the gap between copyright and patent by providing explicit yet
limited protection for this broad class of valuable works to-




A. Introduction to Cybernetics and Information Theory
Cybernetics: "The theoretical study of control processes in
electronic, mechanical, and biological systems, especially the
mathematical analysis of the flow of information in such sys-
tems. [Coined by Norbert Wiener from Greek kubernetes, pi-
lot, governor, from kubernan, to steer, guide, govern.] "199
Information Theory: "The theory of the probability of trans-
mission of messages with specified accuracy when the bits of
information constituting the messages are subject, with certain
probabilities, to transmission failure, distortion, and accidental
additions.
200
Information: "communication or knowledge .... A nonacci-
dental signal used as an input to a computer or communica-
tions system.
' 20 1
The protection of intellectual property is the protection of in-
formation and its application. The subject matter of patent is
information for implementing physical objects or processes.
2 2
The subject matter of copyright is the expression of informa-
tion itself.20 3 The original subject matter of copyright, encom-
fled subject matter of the 1790 Copyright Act: "authors of any map, chart, book or
books .... " (emphasis added).
197. The microcircuit layout is the photographic template (or "mask") from which a
ROM, microprocessor or other microelectronic "chip" is produced. See C. SIPPL & R.
SIPPL, supra note 3.
198. "Micromachines"-tiny valves, nozzles, pressure sensors and other mechani-
cal systems--even an entire gas chromatograph---can be chemically etched in a wafer
of single-crystal silicon, and can be mass-produced much as microelectronic circuits
are. See Angell, Terry & Barth, Silicon Micromechanical Devices, Sci. Aml., April 1983,
at 44.
199. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 328 (New College ed. 1980).
200. Id. at 675.
201. Id. at 674.
202. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
203. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
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passing maps, charts and books, was generalized to "writings"
in 1909.204 It has been further expanded to include virtually all
forms of expression, "now known or later developed," from
which the works "can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. '20 ' The determining prerequisite appears to be the
presence of original information capable of communication,
i.e., messages. The study of the communication of this broadly
defined class of "messages '206 is information theory, which
falls within the original "ambitious definition of cybernetics":
Besides the electrical engineering theory of the transmission
of messages, there is a larger field which includes not only the
study of language but the study of messages as a means of con-
trolling machinery and society, the development of computing
machines and other such automata, certain reflection upon
psychology and the nervous system, and a tentative new the-
ory of scientific method.
[This was Wiener's own definition; more simply:] In brief, cy-
bernetics is the study of the twin processes of communication
and control in humans, in machines, and in systems comprised
of either or both. As Boolean logic had made no great distinc-
tion between the logic of numbers and the logic of words, so
cybernetics offered no clear-cut division between communica-
tion processes in humans and in machines. That was in fact
one of the aims of cybernetic theory-to create a theory of
messages scientifically rigorous enough to include all forms of
information transmission.20 7
The constitutional mandate "To promote the Progress of Sci-
ence" tacitly validates the prevailing philosophy whereby Co-
pernicus displaced the Earth from the absolute center of the
Universe,20 8 Darwin later dethroned Man from his position as
204. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1909).
205. 17 U.S.C. § 102.
206. "Messages" may not necessarily be readily understandable to a human being
in this context, but rather are "streams" of information.
207. See D. HANSON, supra note 4, at 51. Boolean logic is a mathematical analysis of
logic, named after its formulator, nineteenth century British mathematician, George
Boole. See C. SIPPL & R. SIPPL, supra note 3. Boolean logic deals with "set theory," a
branch of mathematical logic which codifies the classical syllogistic logic of Socrates et
al. within a rigorous mathematical framework. The classical "A implies B" proposition
is restated as "A is a subset of B"; "A OR B" is recast as "the union of [sets] A and B";
A AND B" becomes "the intersection of [sets] A and B" and "NOT A" is now signified
by "the complement of A." Because this so-called predicate calculus deals rigorously
with the "quantities" TRUE and FALSE, ON and OFF, membership and non-member-
ship, "1" and "0," it is ideally suited to the realm of the binary digital computer.
208. See generally ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrrTANICA (1971).
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the absolute image of God,20 9 and Einstein replaced our abso-
lute conception of space, time, matter and energy with a rela-
tive one.210 Wiener's theory of the cybernetic equivalence of
communication in man and machine is simply the next logical
step in that "Progress." That machines can share with humans
the function of recipient or even originator of information is
disquieting not only to Commissioner Hersey 21' and the Apple
court,
2 1 2 but to computer scientist Joseph Weizenbaum 213 and,
perhaps, to ourselves. But if one accepts the technological re-
alities that allow a microcomputer to be the "steersman" of a
cruise missile,214 then the computer program in its memory is
the ultimate form of the "map" or "chart" protected in the Act
of 1790.215
B. Information Theory and Intellectual Property
The scientific analysis of information and its communication
as messages is based on the representation of all information
in the form of numbers, which can be measured. The ninety-
six codes signifying the ninety-six printing symbols used in
this note,1 6 the multitude of codes required for digital televi-
217 teblin cnsion, the billions of numbers comprising CAT scans of
human organs,21 8 like all numeric symbols, may ultimately be
reduced to sequences of "bits."219 Although each bit contains
only the smallest possible amount of information-0 or 1, OFF
or ON, NO or YES, FALSE or TRUE-in groups they can rep-
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See CONTU, supra note 52, at 37.
212. See Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 824-825.
213. See generally J. WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON 158, 240
(1975).
214. See Cruise Missile: Wonder Weapon or Dud?, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, Feb. 1983, at
26.
215. 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
216. ASCII (the American Standard Code for Information Interchange). A stan-
dard 8-bit information code used with most computers and data terminals. See C.
SIPPL & R. SIPPL supra note 3.
217. See Fawcette, Direct Satellite TV: The 12-GHz Challenge, HIGH TECHNOLOGY,
Jan./Feb. 1982, at 42.
218. Computer Assisted Tomography (CAT) uses a scanning X-ray beam con-
trolled and monitored by a computer to reconstruct three-dimensional images of inter-
nal organs with much better resolution and diagnostic ability than the traditional two-
dimensional "shadow" Roentgen films. See Sternberg, Biomedical Image Processing
COMPUTER, Jan. 1983, at 22.




resent any collection of symbols imaginable. Two bits worth of
information--00, 01, 10, or 11-can identify four different sym-
bols, three bits can be arranged in eight sequences, four in six-
teen; in brief, a string of n bits has 2n (two to the "n"th power)
possible combinations it can represent.22 °
Anything written in English can be represented as a se-
quence of these eight-bit groups, called "bytes"; given modern
telecommunications and typesetting technology, most non-
trivial written "works of authorship" probably exist some-
where in such binary representation.22' Digital master tech-
niques 222 in the recording industry and digital video22 3 in
broadcasting (to a lesser extent), extend the possibilities to al-
most every conceivable "medium of expression.
'224
The information theoretic content of each byte is said to be
eight since each contains eight bits, having 28 (or 256) possible
permutations.22 The sentence you are now reading has an "in-
formation content" of 960, because it contains 120 characters of
8 bits each. Thus there are 2120x8 different possible sequences
of 120 eight-bit characters. Of course, very few of them are
meaningful, but there is only one chance in 2960 (approximately
a three followed by 304 zeroes,) that a "monkey at a type-
writer"226 would type that particular sentence. Even though
these incredible "odds" would be greatly reduced if the typist
were limited to English words, syntax and semantics, 227 they
would still be astronomically against "coincidental" creation of
that exact sentence. This "probability of transmission of
messages with specified accuracy, 228 i.e., probability of plagia-
220. Each of the 52 keys on this typewriter can be represented by a unique se-
quence of six bits having 26, i.e., 64, possible combinations (with 12 to spare). A sev-
enth bit may be added to represent the shift key, (which may be UP or DOWN), which
causes a different symbol to be printed when DOWN, and an eighth bit is usually ad-
ded to act as a "check" for reliability.
221. E.g., on 'The Source," a large commercial free-text database of literary works.
222. See Mitchell, Digital Revolution Comes To HiFi, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, Jan./Feb.
1982, at 70.
223. See supra note 217.
224. See supra note 54.
225. Permutations, as opposed to combinations, are concerned with the order, not
merely the composition of a set.
226. Note, Can A Computer Be an Author? Copyright Aspects of Artificial Intelli-
gence, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 707, 714 (1982).
227. The rules of English spelling, for example, require words which are pronounce-
able: i.e., no triple letters, and a mix of vowels and consonants, etc.
228. See supra note 200.
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rism, copying or unauthorized derivation, subjectively under-
lies all decisions in copyright law.
For over half a century the classic arbiter of "substantial
similarity" in copyright infringement suits has been the hypo-
thetical "ordinary observer." '229 For the readily identifiable fea-
tures of a copyrightable work, this would still seem
appropriate, just as an "ordinary witness" may identify a sus-
pect based on facial and physical features. The "expert wit-
ness," skilled in specialized forms of scientific evidence, i.e.,
fingerprinting,230 handwriting231 or ballistics,232 is of value
when the issues are too complex for the "ordinary observer."
Because the field of cybernetics is complex, the "ordinary ob-
server" may have to give way to the expert witness.
An illustration of such a situation is found in the video game
copyright case, Williams v. Artic, mentioned earlier.233 The
Williams program provided that the words "COPYRIGHT
1980-WILLIAMS ELECTRONICS" in code were to be stored
in its ROMs, but were not to be displayed on the video screen
at any time, thus providing a "buried" or hidden copyright no-
tice. Using a laboratory developmental device, Williams' em-
ployees printed out a listing in code of the contents of the
ROMs of both games. In excess of 85% of the listings were
identical and contained the "buried" Williams copyright notice
in code.
In addition to the expertise necessary to operate the "labora-
tory developmental device" to print out the listing, a potential
"expert witness" should possess a fundamental knowledge of
information theory and computer programming. A trier of fact,
lacking appreciation for the myriad ways a single procedure
may be programmed,234 might feel that the similarity indicated
by "85% . . . identical"2 35 code could be coincidental. Such an
"ordinary observer" might well appreciate the implausibility of
the thirty-seven characters in Williams's buried copyright no-
tice appearing by chance in Artic's program, yet not see the
229. See generally Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d
Cir. 1960); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
230. McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE 502 (2d ed. 1972).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 876 n.6.
234. See CONTU, supra note 52, at 20 n.106.
235. See Williams, 685 F.2d at 876 n.6.
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improbability of "accidentally" duplicating much longer se-
quences of "meaningless" l's and O's. Sufficient length of the
"copyrighted sequence" is thus critical to any determination of
infringement. For example, 85% identity between two se-
quences of twenty words, (i.e., seventeen in common), is far
less indicative of copying than 8500 of a ten-thousand-word
short story.
Although classical tests of similarity are not explicitly quan-
titative, they do set a subjective lower bound on the "informa-
tion content" of works deemed copyrightable subject matter,
as expressed in the "abstractions test" articulated by Judge
Learned Hand:
Upon any work ... a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the inci-
dent is left out .... [T] here is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the
playright could prevent the use of his "ideas", to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never extended.
236
Applying this reasoning to specific subject matter, the courts
have invalidated copyrights of scenes a faire in literary and
dramatic works,237 musical phrases of less than several bars,238
and prototypical action sequences in video games.2 39 The
psuedo-quantitative formulation of this reasoning in informa-
tion theoretic terms might be:
I("infringing" work) - I(copyrighted work)
< "chance"
I("universe of discourse")
where "I" represents the "information theoretic content" of a
"work." "I"(infringing) is the "value" of the sequence of bits
representing the alleged infringing work. "I"(copyrighted)
represents the equivalent quantity for the allegedly infringed
(copyrighted) work. "I"(universe of discourse) represents the
potential information content of the sequences of bits consti-
tuting the totality of possible expressions within the domain of
expression shared by the two works. The numerator in this
236. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) cert. denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931).
237. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 980 (1976). "Scenes afaire" are the common recurring themes of dramatic and
literary works, such as the hero saving the girl from the railroad track where the villain
has tied her; as such they are part of the public domain and are not protected.
238. B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, COPYRIGHT 233 (3d ed. 1978).
239. See Atari, 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
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"formula" represents the difference between the two works,
and the denominator specifies the range of possible expres-
sions of the underlying "idea." "< chance" is read "very much
less than chance," and is a subjective assessment of the
"odds." The likelihood of "copying" increases as the
probability of "accidental" similarity decreases, that is, as the
difference between the works decreases relative to the denomi-
nator (the number of expressions available to an independent
originator).
The importance of the "denominator" is demonstrated by
the contrasting holdings in two cases, each involving the copy-
righted likeness of a small creature. In Rosenthal v.
Kalpakian,2 ° the copyright of a jeweled bee pin was upheld,
while a similar pin was found non-infringing; in Walt Disney v.
Air Pirates,24 ' the familiar likeness of Mickey Mouse was pro-
tected against infringement. The Kalpakian court reasoned
that "[t] here is no greater similarity between the pins of plain-
tiff and defendant than is inevitable from the use of jewel-en-
crusted bee forms in both." '242 In Air Pirates, the denominator
of "all possible cartoon mice" is greater in scope than that of
"all possible realistic bees," and hence "in view of the unique
qualities embodied in plaintiff's drawings, they would surely
be held protectible .... 243
Patent also has language expressing this formulation. It pro-
vides a limited monopoly on "new and useful"' 2 " inventions
sufficiently different from "prior art" (the numerator), yet suffi-
ciently "non-obvious ' 245 to avoid monopolizing scientific
truths, laws of nature, or "ideas,' 2  (the denominator, exactly
as in copyright interpretations).
The cybernetic copyright expressly states the information-
theoretic equation which has formed the unarticulated basis
for determining copyright infringement and patent validity. In
the complex field of computer technology where the traditional
"fuzzy" notions of testing substantial similarity by using the
"ordinary observer" tend to fail, the cybernetic copyright offers
a workable alternative. By extending the scope of copyright to
240. See Rosenthal, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
241. See Walt Disney, 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
242. See Rosenthal, 446 F.2d at 742.
243. See Walt Disney, 345 F. Supp. at 113.
244. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
245. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
246. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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cover cybernetic systems while simultaneously offering a
means to test infringement, the cybernetic copyright closes the
"gap" between patent and copyright.
C. Implementation of the Cybernetic Copyright
One issue not addressed in Williams v. Artic247 was the spe-
cific technique used to determine that "[iun excess of 85% [or
any other fraction] of the listings [of the program code] are
identical. '" 24  Although a "sight comparison" was probably
used, "verifier 2 49 programs are commonly used in the industry
to confirm that a master program is correctly reproduced in a
"target" ROM.250 Such simple "bit-for-bit" comparisons are of
no assistance when even simple "automatic" disguising tech-
niques are employed.25 ' Particularly at the "source code"
level,25 2 trivial renamings and rearrangements of the original
elements can lend a semblance of originality to the end prod-
uct.253 In programs of several thousand lines, 2 4 where com-
puter-directed substitutions and reorderings could also
number in the thousands, detection may be beyond human
powers. To defeat such ruses involving purely "mechanical"
transformations, yet protect truly independent creations from
false accusation, automated detection methods are required.
Such methods are not unknown: a classic application of
computer analysis of "writings" is the determination of dis-
247. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
248. Id. at 876 n.6.
249. See Bailey, Software Strengthens Development Tools, ELECTRONIC DESIGN, Feb.
4, 1982, at 77.
250. A "target" ROM is the chip on (into) which the software is written, producing
"firmware." Id.
251. Even a rudimentary word-processing system, much less powerful than the typ-
ical program editor, can perform a "global search and replace" of one pattern with
another; in literary terms, it could mechanically change all the person and place names
in a work, and with an on-line thesaurus substitute every verb, noun and modifier in a
matter of minutes. The resultant "translation" would probably contain no obviously
plagiarized sequences longer than a few words, yet the works would be semantically
the same intellectual property.
252. The original mnemonic or high-level statement versions of a program. The
starting information or "source" from which the final "object" (machine language or
final code) is derived. See supra note 25.
253. See supra note 251.
254. E.g., the American Airlines SABRE program of over 1,000,000 source lines.
Gemignani, Legal Protection For Computer Software: The View From '79, 7 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 269 (1980).
No. 31
COMM/ENT L. 1.
puted authorship in The Federalist Papers.2s5 Of the seventy-
seven works, forty-three were acknowledged as Hamilton's,
fourteen as Madison's, five as Jay's, three as joint, and twelve
not agreed to be exclusively Hamilton's or Madison's. 256 The
authorship of these twelve papers remained unresolved until
1964, largely owing to the remarkable similarities in style and
subject of the two contemporaries' works.25 7 The known works
of each author were first divided into two random sets, and
conclusive differences between the first set of each author's
known works were ascertained. The accuracy of these "dis-
criminating" parameters was then verified by application to
the second known set before use on the third and "disputed"
set. (The disputed works were all found to have a very high
probability of being Madison's.)
25 8
More recently, scaled-down variants of these techniques
have become available in association with word-processing
programs, notably Writer's Workbench (WWB), 259 developed
for the Bell Laboratories' Patent Department, and the Gram-
matik260 program, which runs on personal computers. Each
program operates by first "inverting' 261 the input text, generat-
ing a glossary, concordance 262 and syntactic analysis, 263 and
then comparing these to be a specified "profile" of model text.
While Grammatik uses a standard profile for locating
problems, Bell's WWB allows the writer to submit a selection
of "exemplary" works from which to build the profile, resulting
in such outputs as "You have used the passive voice in 44.2% of
255. F. MOSTELLER & D. WALLACE, INFERENCE AND DISPUTED AUTHORSHIP: THE FED-
ERALIST (1964).
256. Id. at 3.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 249, 263.
259. McMahon, Cherry & Morris, Statistical Text Processing, 57 BELL SYSTEM TECH.
J., no. 6, pt. 2, at 2137 (1978).
260. See Rodgers, Ready to be Edited by Computer?, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Jan.
17, 1983, at 14.
261. "Inverting" a data structure means reorganizing it in a different order, as in
taking a court calendar sequenced by date and sorting it by party name. Inversion of a
text file sorts all the component words in alphabetical order, and compresses dupli-
cates with a reference number (sequence in the text) for each occurrence. Especially
when combined with a standard on-line dictionary, this "concordance" or cross refer-
ence is not only much more compact than the original text (having no redundancies)
but permits searching by Keyword in Context (KWIC).
262. Id.
263. A syntactic analysis of a text is the computational equivalent of parsing




your sentences, while the expository texts submitted employ it
in only 21.8%.11264 Comparable analytical tools could help es-
tablish the border between coincidental similarity and actual
copying when numerous obfuscating transformations have
been used to disguise a pirated work.
D. Potential Objections to the Cybernetic Copyright
One superficial obstacle to the acceptance of a cybernetic
copyright, the limited vocabulary and syntax of most program-
ming languages, 265 actually facilitates implementation of the
automated analytic tools. English and other natural languages
are so rich in variation and complexity that the "denominator"
(denoting the number of possible expressions of the "idea") is
beyond calculation for all but trivial cases. 266 Programming
languages, on the other hand, have a highly restricted "regular
grammar" making such calculation feasible, and the tools to
analyze all legitimate expressions in each language already
exist.267 These "lexical" and "syntactic-analyzers" are the best
understood and most formally mechanized aspects of modern
compiler design, 268 and techniques for the "automatic" genera-
tion of such translators are commonplace.269
Three objections to copyright protection for software most
frequently voiced by avowed computer industry spokesmen
are: (1) that the free flow of ideas may be impeded by offering
protection to software; 270 (2) that only a tiny fraction of all pro-
grams written have been registered with the Copyright Of-
fice;271 and (3) that progress in software has been "sufficient"
without any protection.2  While computer hardware is ap-
proaching its "fifth generation, '2 73 software has barely
progressed beyond its infancy.274 Until recently, most pro-
grams were written for one type of system only, were often
sold "bundled" with the hardware, and were not directly reus-
264. See supra note 259.
265. See generally W. McKEEMAN, J. HORNING & D. WORTMAN, A COMPILER GENERA-
TOR (1970).
266. Id. at 22.
267. Id. at 27.
268. Id. at 71.
269. Id. at 123.
270. See CONTU, supra note 52, at 33.
271. Id. at 34.
272. Id. at 30.




able on another type of machine.275 Protection (and registra-
tion) were thus of little concern until the advent of
"transportable" applications programs and operating software
about 1976,276 which resulted in the explosive growth of the in-
dependent software industry. 7  Competition in the once
sparsely populated field of independent software vendors27
now mandates substantial capital expenditures in a new ven-
ture, and the economic viability perceived by potential inves-
tors may depend upon protection afforded the innovation
against rampant piracy.
279
One final objection may come from the legal profession,
speaking out against the apparent dehumanization of the legal
process foreshadowed in "judgment by computer." This view
is best articulated in Commissioner Hersey's dissent to the
CONTU majority's recommendation for software copyright:
A society that accepts in any degree such equivalences of
human beings and machines must become impoverished in the
long run in those aspects of the human spirit which can never
be fully quantified and which machines may be able in some
distant future to linquistically "understand" but will never be
able to experience ... This concern is by no means irrelevant
to the issue of whether computer programs should be copy-
righted. It is the heart of the matter.28 °
V
Conclusion
Any sufficiently advanced technology
is indistinguishable from magic.
-Arthur C. Clarke
281
It is unlikely that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
computer programs when they granted Congress the "Power to
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," but they
clearly recognized economic incentive to be the best stimulus
275. Id. at 47.
276. See generally DIGrrAL RESEARCH, INC. ANNUAL REPORT (1982). Digital Research
is a five-year-old software development firm responsible for the most widely distrib-
uted operating system (or monitor) for personal microcomputers: CP/M (Control Pro-
gram for Microcomputers).
277. See supra note 6.
278. Id.
279. J. BAUMGARTEN, COPYRIGHT AND COMPUTER SOFTWARE, 2-14 (1982).
280. See CONTU, supra note 52, at 37.
281. See HANSON, supra note 4, at 132.
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for such progress. 282 Congress has exercised this power by
continually expanding the scope of works protected by copy-
right.28 3 Just as the design patent 84 serves to protect a utilita-
rian object embodying artistic expression, so the cybernetic
copyright would protect the particular expression of a utilita-
rian function. It would indeed be a tragedy if, through misun-
derstanding and resistance to change, the provisions by the
visionaries of the 1780's for protection of "useful" forms of "in-
tellectual property" should be construed in the 1980's as ex-
cluding works both intellectual and useful. More than any
other useful creation of man, computer software approaches
the "universal machine" in complexity and power. It is a two-
edged sword that is capable of embodying and manipulating
abstractions bordering on "ideas" themselves. The scope of
the cybernetic copyright affords the protection necessary for
technological progress yet provides the appropriate safeguard
against the monpolization of those ideas.
(Author's Note: On August 30, 1983, thirteen months after the
lower court decision and during publication of this note, the
Third Circuit overturned the trial court's ruling that Apple's
operating system programs were not copyrightable. The appel-
late court ruled that programs embodied in ROM chips are pro-
tected under the Copyright Act.)
282. See supra note 70.
283. See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
284. 35 U.S.C. § 171.
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